An Afghan twister in the making
Ramtanu Maitra
On April 3, the day this memo is written, 11 NGOs operating in Afghanistan has come out with a 27-page report, Caught in the Conflict, critical of two U.S./NATO initiated program, okayed by President Karzai. It is apparent that the release of the report timed to coincide with the NATO’s 60th Summit. I do not have names of all eleven NGOs . The ones I have are: Christian Aid, CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children UK, Action Aid, International Action Committee, Care in Afghanistan, Acbar ( the umbrella group representing 100 NGOs operating in Afghanistan). Two items in this report are of importance. Around September of last year, U.S. decided to launch a new program in Afghanistan, tentatively dubbed the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP). It has a number of backers. In early December, it was approved by President Karzai, with the endorsement of the ministers of interior and defense. "There is common agreement among the Afghan leadership, people, and international forces that there needs to be a bottom-up approach to security and progress in this country, as well as a top-down central government approach," says Gen. David McKiernan, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. From what little has beeen made available so far, and I read, ASOP will recruit militants ( ostensibly ex-Taliban) from the provinces to form a militia in the Taliban-troubled areas. These Afghan forces would be on the U.S. payroll, which officials hope will also entice some former insurgents to work with NATO forces. "We bring money so we can hire young men to be the first line of defense" in small towns throughout Afghanistan, a senior U.S. military official in Kabul was quoted in one article (I think it is Ambassador William Wood. The statement fits his profile to a tee). "We wouldn't be surprised if some of them used to be insurgents. We figure this is a way to crack the nut." One U.S. military official was quoted in one article saying, “Vetting these forces is one of the chief concerns for forces on the ground here. We need to make sure we're employing the right people to provide security for the population." He ( I do not know who this "he" is but he traveled with Secretary Gates in December to Afghanistan) also pointed out in that article that avoiding bolstering or creating local warlords with infusions of cash—which happened once before, early in the war in Afghanistan—will entail making sure that power isn't concentrated in any one group. He also said the U.S. military has told local elders, "We're going to help you, but you have to agree among yourselves and empower certain leaders to work with those who want to work with you, in coordination with the national government so you're not creating some parallel structure." While the groups will be paid by the Pentagon, the U.S. official in Kabul notes that their salaries "won't be close" to what Afghan soldiers or police earn and that, as in Iraq, they will not be given weapons. "They're generally already armed," adds the official who traveled with Gates. "Caught in the Conflict" report criticized the program, and called for temporary suspension of the program pending re-evaluation. Its main opposition to the program is that it is being used by President Karzai to hand out patronage using the American money. The report says the program is intended to create district councils in several provinces, including Kandahar where Canada's 2,800 troops are headquartered, in order to improve communication with ordinary Afghans and provide information on insurgent activities. Council appointees draw government salaries and are appointed by senior Afghan government officials, leading to likely accusations of patronage and potential inter-tribal tensions if there are ethnic imbalances on councils, the critics argued in the report. The councils could also be infiltrated by the rebels, the NGOs said. The outreach initiative was endorsed last September by the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board, a body made up of senior Afghan ministers and representatives of the international community. "Despite being criticized by a range of Afghanistan experts, the program has been endorsed by the monitoring board, and several donors are intending to implement the program: the U.S. in six provinces, the U.K. in Helmand, Canada in Kandahar, and possibly others elsewhere," according to Caught in the Conflict. "As it stands, the program carries a high risk of failing to deliver positive political or security outcomes, or even exacerbating local conditions," the report claimed. But beyond what the NGOs said, this program has other serious problems. In many ways, this is a copy-cat program used by the United States ( Gen. Petreaus) in Iraq. The plan is modeled in part on a similar program in Iraq to build up Sunni neighborhood militias. This is the Sons of Iraq program, ostensibly to incorporate them into the Iraqi Army over a period of time. That has not happened very well. As a result, some of these Sons of Iraq are now mercenaries available for a gunfight, or two. The second program is the Afghan Public Protection Force(APPF). A pilot program has ben launched in the Wardak province, next door to Kabul. The Caught in Conflict report said the establishment of Afghan Public Protection Forces (APPF), should be abandoned immediately, even though trials have only just begun in Wardak, a troubled province just south of Kabul. A NATO spokesman said (reported by The Guardian, UK) both schemes were the responsibility of the Afghan government and would be tightly controlled. But western diplomats say the APPF plan was pushed on an unwilling government by the US general (must be Gen. Craddock) in charge of NATO forces in Afghanistan. They also fear it will re-create some of the tribal militias that the international community has spent hundreds of millions of dollars attempting to disarm. Mohammad Mayar, deputy director of Acbar, the umbrella group representing nearly 100 NGOs in Afghanistan, said the scheme would be destabilizing and repeat previous failures. "I am from Wardak. There are three different ethnicities [in the province] so there are a lot of complications. We have had the experience in the past where people have changed sides and people have escaped with weapons." Kabul, in a recent promo write-up of this program said: “…The APPF program is meant to be a temporary organization while the training of regular Afghan National Police catches up with the need. APPF members who prove trustworthy and capable will have the opportunity to transfer to the Afghan National Army and Police. But once there is a sufficient number of trained Afghan National Police, the program will be disband.” But U.S.officials warn that the forces will be carefully vetted to avoid repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan's past, notably bolstering local warlords. I have noticed that some unnamed senior U.S. officials have made known to the media that they worry privately about launching a program modeled on the U.S.-financed militias of Iraq, given the considerable differences in the wars. Kabul, in its promo write-up, also says: “…The APPF plan calls for fielding some lightly armed, quickly trained gunmen associated with tribes. They will be used in important areas where the government is in danger of losing control. The APPF is not expected to be a stand-alone organization. It is one part of a larger, three-pillar, organization designed to support police functions. The first pillar is the regular Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). The problem is that the AUP have too often been assigned basic tasks such as protecting roads, schools, and government buildings. They are reduced to being guards. So the second pillar, the APPF, will release the AUP from these functions. The goal is not to create a “tribal militia” but something closer to a "neighborhood watch," albeit one more concerned about preventing beheadings and school burnings than burglaries. The final pillar is the Anti-Crime Division to provide investigative services (i.e., police detectives). So, for example, the district of Panjwai would have approximately 90 Afghan Uniform Police supported by six Anti-Crime Division investigators and 200 APPF…” But it should also be noted, and that is my concern, is that these things can create monsters out of control. Consider this: In 2001, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum ( a very powerful ethnic Uzbek warlord and a leader of the Northern Alliance, based in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif) and his militia, Jumbish-e-Milli, loaded as many as 2,000 people–”suspected al-Qaida and Taliban”–into metal cargo containers. Most suffocated; Dostum’s lackeys shot the others. The general’s men buried them in the desert. When word got out about the mass grave in 2008, they used bulldozers to exhume and remove corpses to hide the evidence. NATO forces and the U.S. Defense Department kept silent because Afghan warlord Dostum helped oust the Taliban. The CIA funded Afghan warlords to the tune of millions of dollars. They killed “suspected Taliban and al-Qaida” for us, and we said nothing when they slaughtered thousands via suffocation and close-range execution by firearm. While introduction of more U.S. troops is unacceptable, trying to do a social engineering project in a minefield strewn with thousands of mines could also spell disaster. I just wanted to point this out.
